Israel’s forgotten victim card
Surrounded by enemies, Israel must find a way to survive both physically and ideologically.
I generally do not write blog posts any more. But a few days ago I was discussing current affairs with Tove. She concluded that if I liked holding monologues about what is happening in the world I could just as well write a blog post about it.
The topic I was pestering Tove with was Israel. Or, more specifically, the war in Gaza. Israel is of course not unknown to readers of Wood from Eden. For the simple reason that it is the only rich country with a decent fertility rate. The war in Gaza is not directly linked to fertility. But indirectly there are some touching points.
Knock, knock
The specific news piquing my interest this time was a mention of a friendly fire incident in northern Gaza where five Israeli soldiers were killed by fire from two Israeli tanks. Such things happen of course, and I would not have given it much thought had the news not mentioned in passing that the tanks belonged to the Hetz company, a special unit of the Israeli armed forces specifically tailored to suit Haredi, that is ultra-orthodox, soldiers.
This was interesting. Haredis are increasing rapidly as a share of the Israeli population and they have a blanket exemption from serving in the military. For Israel, this is an existential threat since an ever-increasing share of the population does not contribute to its military defense.
Due to political gridlock it has not been possible to remove the Haredi exemption (and the Haredis increasing share of the voters makes it less likely for every year). Instead, the military has done its utmost to lure Haredis into serving voluntarily. Haredis are not banned from the armed forces, they just do not have to serve like every other Israeli.
One way of luring Haredi recruits is special units like the Hetz company. These units are tailored to not collide with any religious convictions that ultra-orthodox Jews might have. Most of all they are completely free of women, who otherwise permeate most parts of the Israeli armed forces.
The Haredi units are designed to have limited contact with other Israeli units. And here was a case of friendly fire, at some level undoubtedly caused by too limited contact between different units. Of course I was intrigued.
The reality turned out to be a bit more complicated. Some more research revealed that the deceased soldiers were from the same battalion as the tankers, and were themselves Haredi. Lack of communication clearly played a part but friction between Haredis and non-Haredis probably did not.
Armed Haredis
The problem with Haredis in the armed forces of Israel does not seem to be any lack of competence on their part. At least I can find no complaints about their behavior. The problem is rather the opposite, the Hetz company, and several other Haredi units, are under threat of disbandment due to a lack of recruits. Haredi men simply do not want to serve as soldiers.
This indicates that Israel's army will not solve its demographic problem with voluntary recruits. Some sort of coercion will be required, Haredi men will need to have their exemption from conscription revoked, or at least curtailed.
The current political situation in Israel is not amicable to a change like that. Benjamin Netanyahu's government is heavily dependent on Haredi votes. I do not know enough about Israeli politics to judge the chances of that to change. But given the ever-increasing vote share of Haredis, their opinions are likely to get greater weight rather than less.
Israel at a crossroads
Israel's uneven demography hints at changes to come. Even though Israel as a whole has a healthy fertility rate of 3.01, this number masks significant variation, with secular Jewish women having only 2 children (still good by Western standards) and Haredi women almost 7. This dramatic difference means that Israel's population is changing rapidly. Secular Ashkenazi Tel Avivians are out. Ultra-orthodox Mizrahi West Bank settlers are in.
The battle for Israel's soul was waged last year in the supreme court and in gigantic street protests. These were suspended when Hamas started a war on October 7. Since then this undeclared civil war has been suspended, at least as far as I know. Which does not mean that it is not there. It is just being waged less visibly for the time being.
The problem for secular Israelis is that demography really is destiny. There is no way they can keep the Haredi and other religious Jews away from power when these segments of the population are growing rapidly. In time, all of Israel will be like Jerusalem, where ultra-Orthodox parties are in the majority in the city council, meaning they have been able to introduce all manners of interesting municipal regulations, like suspending all public transport on Saturdays, the Jewish shabbat.
Haredis increasingly dominant position will change Israel in more fundamental ways than that. Not least economically. The Haredi are significantly poorer than the general (Jewish) population. They contribute less tax to state coffers but are the recipients of a lot of government grants and welfare payments. Public finances will be increasingly strained with a growing Haredi population.
Welfare and grant payments can be curtailed. But lower tax income per capita will be difficult to mitigate. The Israeli government's expenditure per capita will undoubtedly have to shrink if its income per capita shrinks. This will affect all parts of Israeli society including the army, which requires a considerable part of the government budget. On the other hand, since the Haredi do generally not serve in the armed forces, Israel's army might make do with less government money if they only get as much money per soldier as before.
Sunset empire
Having less and less soldiers to work with need not be a problem if one has fewer and fewer wars to fight. After all, Israel spends considerably more on its military than other rich countries. If they could just limit their conflicts and decrease military spending accordingly, there would not be a problem.
Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the philosophy of Israel. When Hamas initiated hostilities by attacking southern Israel from Gaza, Israel had a golden opportunity to play the victim card. Instead they chose to escalate by invading Gaza.
This was most probably the wrong call. Israel's security has de facto not increased by the Gaza invasion. On the contrary. Hamas have turned out to be accomplished guerilla fighters. Even after a six month onslaught they continue to harass Israeli troops. It is possible that they will never be completely defeated.
Not only has Israel serious problems with defeating Hamas. The attack on Gaza and the inevitable civilian casualties means that Israel's international reputation has once again plummeted. This is most noteworthy in the Middle East, where Israel had cultivated several fruitful collaborations with Arab states, among them the United Arab Emirates and Morocco. The carnage in Gaza has set these collaborations back years, if not decades.
Of course, Israeli politicians had no real option of refraining from attacking Gaza. The Israeli population demanded blood. An opinion poll from January this year showed that only a yaw-dropping 3.2% of Jewish Israelis thought the armed forces used too much force in its operation in Gaza. The option of not launching an operation at all was not even on the ballot.
Being lured into foolish military adventures for domestic reasons is reminiscent of another great empire of today, the American one. America has been unlucky in most of its military endeavors over the last thirty years. Being American does not seem to be the worst of outcomes. However, there is one important difference between America and Israel. America can afford to be stupid. Israel can not.
The power of the dark side
That is, unless Israel is consciously stupid. Diplomatically and militarily the invasion of Gaza has clearly been disastrous. But there might be political benefits to reap. Israel's relation to the Palestinian territories has been more or less unchanged since the Oslo Accords, thirty years ago. And since the end of the Second Intifada, twenty years ago, the Israeli public has more and more come to ignore the Palestinian question.
Bringing Palestinians to the fore of Israeli politics may animate and embolden certain groups of Israeli society. According to a New York Times exposé, West Bank settlers have dramatically increased their land grabs and violence towards Palestinians since the October 7 attacks. They have been able to do so since the war in Gaza has fostered a siege mentality in which much more than before is allowed.
The old saying that nothing unites as a common enemy is as true as ever. Last year’s Hamas attack was a golden opportunity for Israel to get sympathy from the world, including from most of its Middle Eastern neighbors. Sympathy that could have been traded for better relations and maybe a lasting peace. It looks like an opportunity wasted. But only if Israel wanted peace and good neighborly relations. If Israel instead wanted conflict and continued pressure on the Palestinians then the opportunity given to them by Hamas was to escalate the conflict without too much international blowback. Israel seemed to have jumped on this latter opportunity with gusto.
The Ghost of Hanukkahs Yet to Come
Why would anyone want war over peace? Religious and historical aspects aside, there is an obvious explanation: demography. Israel is severely lacking in land and its population is growing rapidly. The classic solution to that problem is to encroach on your neighbors land. Something Israel has been doing more or less since its inception.
For the last couple of decades, peace with the Palestinians has not exactly been top of the list of Israeli political priorities. At least not compared to creating opportunities for a growing population. These political priorities are not automatically changing just because something unexpected happens. Seen from that perspective it is only natural that the Hamas attack was not used to make peace but rather to make war, or at least unrest.
Where do the Haredis fit into this picture? To be honest, I am not completely sure. What seems certain is that the current right-wing tilt in Israeli politics will continue. Haredis do not vote as a block but they seem to universally vote for right-of-center parties. These parties are almost always adherents of a militarily strong Israel and avid supporters of West Bank settlements.
Even more interesting than politics is the cultural and social aspects. Haredi are poorer and more religious than the average Israeli. They are also less civic-minded in the sense that they put less importance in the state of Israel and more importance in their Jewish religion. Haredis happily accept the protection that the Israeli state offers them, but they are not as willing as other Jewish groups to sacrifice themselves to uphold this protection.
In the longer term, this decline in civic spirit risks spoiling the very glue that keeps the Israeli state together. As the New York Times exposé points out, the rule of law is already being hollowed out in Israel in favor of crude expansionism. Unless checked, this corruption of the state bureaucracy will lead Israel down the slippery slope towards authoritarianism.
Israel was founded as a nation state in the European mold. Haredis (and other Orthodox Jews for that matter) are making it less so. In an ironic twist the Haredi takeover is making Israel less exceptional and more like the rest of the Middle East. Jewish Israel might very well vanquish the Palestinians. But doing so, they run the risk of becoming more and more like the Arabs themselves.
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> An opinion poll from January this year showed that only a yaw-dropping 3.2% of Jewish Israelis thought the armed forces used too much force in its operation in Gaza. The option of not launching an operation at all was not even on the ballot.
I don't follow this war, or any war for that matter so I can't opine on this. However, I imagine that the chair of urban warfare studies with the Modern War Institute at West Point has the credentials to opine on this, and he agrees with the opinion of most Israelis. In fact, he states that the U.S. is causing great damage to Gaza by pressuring Israel to let up.
https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/17/opinions/israel-gaza-hamas-war-us-arms-spencer/index.html
Remember, this poll was taken a while ago, in January, so today the opinion of many Israelis may be to the left of the chair of urban warfare studies with the Modern War Institute at West Point.
Two comments
1) I understand why it makes sense looking from the outside to think of Israel as having two ethnicities, one secular and one Haredi—but still I think it's not right. I'm an American Jew and I've been living in Israel for more than a decade now. I meet a lot of people who used to be Haredi and are now secular, or who used to be secular and are now Haredi. I've even met people who have gone back and forth multiple times, or who have lived most of their lives somehow straddling that divide. The former Haredi, now secular types seem to have had a fairly easy time integrating into secular Israeli society and getting good jobs—I'm fully aware there is a lot that most Haredi schools don't teach in terms of science and math, but the graduates seem for the most part to have decent learning skills and work ethic. I don't think it's right to conceive of Haredi enclaves as being slums of an ethnic underclass, even if they are relatively poorer in statistical terms.
And I think there's a lot of dynamism within the Haredi world in terms of competing streams of thought—you have some groups that are going more closed-off over time while others grow more open, and a lot of people adjusting, moving their family from one Haredi sub-group to another that's a better fit. Keep in mind, this is a culture almost all informed observers wrote off for dead in the 1950s, arguing that this way of life couldn't survive modernity and the elimination of the small-town east European culture that it thrived in. Then there was big demographic growth and also a big return-to-religion movement in Israel in the 1970s and 1980s, and now there are signs that trend is reversing and there may be more people leaving the Haredi community than joining it. There's going to be a lot of social change ahead, neither I nor anyone else can predict how it turns out but current trends just continuing unchanged for decades ahead seems like the least likely scenario to me. My suspicion is that the Haredi community's continued growth will depend to a large extent on its ability to narrow at least somewhat the economic gap between their adherents and the general population—because otherwise the temptation for young people to leave the community will grow.
2) I also understand why the idea of Israel grabbing the West Bank to resolve demographic issues makes sense if you have a background in world history—but I think it's anachronistic. Israel's ability to house and feed its growing population doesn't depend on acquiring more territory, it depends on growing its imports and exports, expanding its infrastructure, and building affordable housing. The overwhelming majority of the food we eat here is imported. The economy isn't much dependent on agriculture or on natural resource extraction. The war has of course been very tough on the economy, and has especially hit the housing construction sector very hard. There's plenty of discussion to be had about the relative role of security concerns, nationalism, religion, political polarization etc. in shaping Israel's policy here but I just don't think there's an economic logic dictating that Israel stands to benefit by trying to absorb the West Bank into itself.