A few weeks ago I found a blog focused on political and military analysis from a Russian perspective. The Saker is written by a man called Andrei who is Russian but lives in Florida. Andrei also claims to be a professional military analyst (the blog does not give any immediate clues to what a professional Russian military analyst is doing in Florida).
At first sight The Saker looks like just another mouthpiece for the Kremlin. On a closer look, this doesn't seem to be the case. It uses some non-authorised phrasing (“the war in Ukraine”) and, more importantly, it actually makes its own analyses. Andrei's analyses are always firmly on the Russian side, but they are not identical with the messages from state approved Russian mass media. Thus, I hope that I have found a real-life individual on the Russian side who speaks his mind in English and without censorship. A view into another world or, rather, a view of the world from another perspective.
Most surprisingly, and actually the reason that I write this article at all, is that sometimes Andrei’s analyses are obviously better than my own: In one article from 23 February Andrei predicted some sort of major military intervention within the next few days. By that time Russian spokesmen officially denied all rumors of an invasion and most Western observers seemed to believe them. Clearly Andrei knew something that was not easily obtained from Western media outlets. That in itself makes his blog worth visiting.
War plans
On 23 February Andrei explained that a full-scale invasion of Ukraine was the only way to achieve the stated objectives of demilitarizing and de-nazifying Ukraine. De-nazifying simply means regime change, which explains the quick push towards Kyiv. Demilitarising, according to Andrei, involves destroying all Ukrainian heavy weapons and forcing a break-down of the military organization. This will still leave plenty of armed Ukrainians, but these will pose no threat to Russia or the Donbas republics and will be left to fight among themselves.
The fact that Andrei was able to predict the upcoming invasion with some precision was impressive. Obviously he had a deep understanding of Russian politics that I myself lacked. His insights as a military analyst are less impressive, but revealing in their own light.
At the start of the invasion Andrei’s comments are well in line with those of Western experts. In an article from February 25, Andrei is exuberant over the progress made in less than two days of fighting. Russian troops have surrounded most important cities in northern and southern Ukraine and, more importantly, they have almost cut off the main body of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in eastern Ukraine. This “closing of the cauldron” in eastern Ukraine will be the theme of Andrei’s articles for the next week or so.
The problem for Andrei, and presumably for the Russian high command, is that this cauldron never closes. The Ukrainian forces in the east are never cut off. In fact, the Russian troops hardly move at all after the first days’ flurry of activity. Andrei’s first map, from three days into the invasion, is eerily similar to the maps one month later, just before the Russian withdrawals from northern Ukraine.
Still, Andrei tries to keep up a brave face. An article summing up the situation one week after the invasion continues the narrative that Russian troops are not trying to advance but are content with surrounding Ukrainian cities and troop concentrations and waiting for them to surrender. Important cities like Kyiv and the Ukrainian troops in the east might not be physically surrounded but they are still surrounded since the Russians can shoot on the exit routes with artillery and aircraft, “surrounded by fire”, which is equally good.
Andrei admits to one disappointment: that the West seems to be winning the information war. In the weekly summary this is more of a nuisance. Major doubt seems not to be setting in until a week later. An article from 9 March, on the 14th day of the invasion, tries to summarize events up to that point. Even though it still hails the Russian accomplishments in surrounding the enemy forces in the east it also admits that the Ukrainians are fighting really hard. Most of all it is a sullen acknowledgement that Ukrainians do not seem to view the Russians as liberators.
The fact that the Russians are not seen as liberators is something of a shock to Andrei and he seems perplexed as to why there have not been any uprisings in cities like Odesa that should have been assuredly pro-Russian. His explanations for this are many but the information war waged by the West is high up on the list. While the Russian propaganda campaign has been lacklustre at best the Western psychological warfare has been unlike anything seen in human history. Despite this there is a lingering suspicion that the Ukrainians really are Russia-hating Nazis. Andrei goes as far as explaining that the loyal subjects to the tsars that inhabited Ukraine in the 19th century are gone forever.
From that nadir things start to look brighter again. On 12 March we can read that the Ukrainian forces around Donbas have been completely surrounded. On 15 March an entire Ukrainian brigade has been wiped out. And on 18 March Ukraine has been so utterly defeated that the only question remaining is whether Poland will enter the fray to prop up a West Ukrainian mini-state.
Polarization in our time
From the perspective of an average Western European this seems odd. It is not what our media has presented us with.
The easy thing to do is to dismiss The Saker as another slightly delusional shill for Russia. Probability does not speak in favor of The Saker but there is still a small but real possibility that it is the West that is deceived. It is a testament to the polarization of our times that The Saker can write tens of thousands of words on a current event and base it on sources that I neither have heard of and out of these come to conclusions that I find outlandish.
This type of polarization is nothing new to the world. During the second world war Germans and Brits had diametrically opposed views of the world. But those days it was easier, because Germans only had access to (highly censored) German media and Brits only had access to (highly censored) British media.
Today’s media environment is totally different. Despite Russian attempts to censor European media and European attempts to censor Russian media people on both sides of the conflict have easy access to non-censored news and information. Nevertheless they still believe their own side and belittle the facts from the other.
The only reasonable interpretation of all this is that man is still not rational as much as religious. The rational weighing of arguments still can not compete with the religious belief in the right thing. In the end the strongest beliefs might overcome the best ideas. To the non-religious, this might seem depressing. But it is also a reason to try to understand bad ideas as well as good ideas. As long as people believe in them they will be relevant, no matter your personal opinion of them.
Thanks for a well-written and well-researched report. The Saker is a very interesting website, and I'd have had no idea about it at all without access to this blog. That's part of the problem with modern search engines: everyone reads the top few hits, and what is less popular is difficult even to discover.
I do wonder what you mean when you speak about humans being "religious" as opposed to "rational." Do you not rather intend to say that humans are ethnocentric, patriotic, or subjective?