A letter from Hitler

On 27 August 1939 a certain Adolf Hitler of Berlin, Germany sent a letter to one Édouard Daladier in Paris, France. The letter was promptly published in its entirety in the French press as depicted in the image at the top of this article. The international media was also quick to report on the letter.

The reason for this was of course that Herr Hitler was chancellor and de facto dictator over Germany (and already on his way to be world history's most famous villain). Monsieur Daladier was prime minister of France and the date was 5 days before Germany's invasion of Poland.

Given Hitler's reputation, one could expect this letter to be full of aggressive threats and belligerent rhetoric. There are traces of that but most of the time it is more of a solemn request for an honorable peace. It is also a letter from a different time, that sounds remarkably much like our own. That makes it worth reading.

Below is an English version of the letter in what I think is its entirety. I have taken the text from the not very famous American newspaper Reading Eagle, the leading newspaper in Reading, Pennsylvania. The reason for this strange choice of source is simple. Reading Eagle was the only newspaper I could find that had printed Hitler's letter in its entirety while also being available in Google News Archive for August 1939. The text below is transcribed from page 2 of the 28 August 1939 issue of Reading Eagle (direct link to source).

Hitler's letter is on the long side and readers pressed for time can skip over it and only enjoy my analysis further down. Personally, I think it is a wonderful little time capsule to read Hitler's own words from 83 years ago. But you will be able to follow the rest of this article even if you choose to only read Anders L and not Adolf H.

For context it should be mentioned that this letter from Hitler is the last one in a series of correspondence between Hitler and Daladier. The parentheses in the text are not present in the French version and must have been added by the English translator. Supposedly this letter was originally written in German. I have not been able to find a German version of it but hopefully the translations bear some resemblance to the original.

From Hitler with love

My dear Minister President:

I understand the misgiving to which you give expression.

I, too, have never overlooked the grave responsibilities which are imposed upon those who are in charge of the fate of nations.

As an old front line fighter, I, like yourself, know the horrors of war. Guided by this attitude and experience, I have tried to remove all matters that might cause conflict between our two peoples.

I have quite frankly given one assurance to the French people, namely, that the return of the Saar would constitute the precondition for this.

After its return I immediately and solemnly pronounced my renunciation of any further claims that might concern France. The German people approved of this, my attitude.

As you could judge for yourself during your last visit here, the German people, in the knowledge of its own behavior held and holds no ill feelings, much less hatred, for its one-time brave opponent.

On the contrary, the pacification of our western frontier led to an increasing sympathy. Certainly as far as the German people are concerned, a sympathy which, on many occasions, showed itself in a really demonstrative way.

The construction of the western fortifications, which swallowed and still swallow many millions (of Marks) at the same time constituted for Germany a document of acceptance and fixation of the final frontiers of the Reich.

In doing so, the German people have renounced two provinces which once belonged to the German Reich, later were conquered again at the cost of much blood, and finally were defended with even more blood.

I believed that by this renunciation and this attitude every conceivable source of conflict between our two peoples that might lead to a repetition of the tragedy of 1914-1918 had been done away with.

This voluntary limitation of the German claims to life in the West, can, however, not be interpreted as an acceptance of all other phases of the Versailles dictate.

I have really tried, year after year, to achieve the revision of at least the most impossible and unbearable provisions of this dictate by way of negotiation. This was impossible.

That the revision had to come was known and clear to a great number of sensible men among all nations. Whatever one may say against my method, whatever one believes one should criticize about it, it must not be overlooked or denied that it became possible for me, without new bloodshed, not only to find solutions satisfactory in many cases to Germany, but that by the method of my procedure I relieved the statesmen of the obligation, frequently impossible, for them, of having to defend this revision before their own peoples.

For your excellency will have to admit one thing to me: The revision had to come. The Versailles dictate was unbearable. No Frenchman with honor - and yourself included, Herr Daladier - would have acted differently from myself in a similar position.

In this sense I have tried to remove from the world the most irrational provisions of the Versailles dictate.

I have made an offer to the Polish government which shocked the German people. Nobody but myself could even dare go before the public with such an offer. It could therefore be made only once.

I am deeply convinced that if, especially, England at that time had, instead of starting a wild campaign against Germany in the press and instead of launching rumors of a German mobilization, somehow talked the Poles into being reasonable, Europe today and for 25 years could enjoy a condition of deepest peace.

As things were, Polish public opinion was excited by a lie about German aggression. Clear decisions that the situation called for were made difficult for the Polish government. Above all, the government’s ability to see the limitations of realistic possibilities was impaired by the guaranty promise that followed.

The Polish government declined the proposals. Polish public opinion, convinced that England and France would now fight for Poland, began to make demands one might possibly stigmatize as laughable insanity were they not so tremendously dangerous.

At that point an unbearable terror, a physical and economic persecution of the Germans although they numbered more than a million and a half began in the regions ceded by the Reich.

I don't want here to speak of the atrocities that occurred. Suffice it to say that Danzig, too, was made increasingly conscious through continuous aggressive acts by Polish officials of the fact that apparently it was delivered over to the high-handedness of a power foreign to the national character of the city and its population.

May I now take the liberty of putting a question to you, Herr Daladier: How would you act as a Frenchman if, through some unhappy issue of a brave struggle, one of your provinces severed by a corridor occupied by a foreign power? And if a big city – let us say Marseilles – were hindered from belonging to France and if Frenchmen living in this area were persecuted, beaten and maltreated, yes, murdered, in a bestial manner?

You are a Frenchman, Herr Daladier, and I therefore know how you would act. I am German, Herr Daladier. Do not doubt my sense of honor nor my consciousness of duty to act exactly like you.

If, then, you had the misfortune that is ours, would you then, Herr Daladier, have any understanding that Germany was without cause to insist that the corridor through France remained, that the robbed territory must not be restored, and that the return of Marseilles be forbidden?

Certainly I cannot imagine, Herr Daladier, that Germany would fight against you for this reason. For, I and all of us, have renounced Alsace-Lorraine in order to avoid further bloodshed. Much less would we shed blood in order to maintain an injustice that would be as unbearable for you as it would be immaterial to us.

Possibly we, as old front fighters, can best understand each other in a number of fields. I ask you, however, do understand this also: That it is impossible for a nation of honor to renounce the claim of almost two million human beings and to see them maltreated at its own borders.

I have therefore set up a clear demand to Poland. Danzig and the Corridor must return to Germany. The Macedonian conditions on our eastern frontier must be removed.

I see no way of persuading Poland, which feels herself as unassailable, now that she enjoys the protection of her guarantees, to accept a peaceful solution.  I should, however, despair of an honorable future for my people if we were not determined under such circumstances to solve the problem in one way or another.

If our two countries on that account should be destined to meet again on the field of battle, there would nevertheless be a difference in the motives. I, Herr Daladier, shall be leading my people in a fight to rectify a wrong, whereas the others would be fighting to preserve that wrong.

That is the more tragic since many important men, also among your own people, have recognized the insanity of the solutions then found (meaning at Versailles) as also the possibility of maintaining it lastingly.

I am perfectly clear about the serious consequences which such a conflict will entail. I believe, however, the Poles would have to bear the greatest burden, for, regardless of who wins in a war about this question, the Polish state of today will be lost in any way you calculate.

That our two peoples should enter a new, bloody war of destruction is painful not only for you, but also for me, Herr Daladier. As already observed, I see no possibility for us on our part to exert influence in the direction of reasonableness upon Poland for correcting a situation that is unbearable for the German people and the German Reich.

– Adolf Hitler

Words from a grand statesman

This letter was sent from Hitler to Daladier. The reason it was published in newspapers rather than in history books is that the German foreign office announced the letter at a press conference at the same time it was sent. The French believed all of this to be what we today would call psychological operations, psyops, with the aim of undermining the French will to fight. For that reason the French government tried to suppress reports of the letter, unsuccessfully, naturally.

The German ambition was to drive a wedge between Poland and France. This letter can be seen as an attempt to convince the French public that Poland's fight was not theirs. That they need not go to war over Germany's aggressive stance towards Poland which, by the way, was entirely legitimate.

Especially the part about Germany renouncing all claims on Alsace-Lorraine probably went down well with the French public. Alsace-Lorraine, the two provinces on the border between France and Germany, had been the major disagreement between the neighbors for the last century or so. Presumably it took the Germans some mental effort to make this concession for the sake of keeping France out of the war.

The letter must also have been published with the domestic German audience in mind. The German public was not as bellicose as Hitler wanted and he needed to show that he had done his bit to avoid war. This letter, with its extensive concessions to France, gave Hitler the possibility to deny that he wanted war. If war still came it must be the fault of Germany's enemies.

Nothing new under the sun

This strategy of blaming a conflict on the invaded seems familiar. In fact, Hitler's entire argumentation is eerily similar to the one presented by Vladimir Putin in the prelude to this year's invasion of Ukraine.

Just like Hitler in his letter, Putin has tried to construct the argument that the very existence of a Ukrainian state is an affront to Russia. At the very least Poland/Ukraine should be subservient to their stronger neighbors and reasonable when faced with justified demands on their territory.

The similarities go even deeper. The Germans in Poland were without doubt discriminated against. Some might have, as Hitler alluded to, been murdered as well. This is a very similar situation to Ukraine where Russian speakers and Russian nationals have been bullied, usually by targeting the Russian language, the preferred method in interwar Poland as well, where obligatory Polish schooling exasperated German, Jewish and Ukrainian minorities alike.

Putin, just like Hitler, also avoided talking directly with his victim. Just as Hitler did not negotiate directly with Poland after presenting his demands, so Putin refused to talk directly with his Ukrainian counterpart. This avoidance of direct contact makes it easier to see the other side as a physical enemy, you do not have cordial contacts with an enemy and if you want to make someone your enemy you better start by ending all cordial contacts. It also avoids the awkward scenario of starting military engagements while negotiations are ongoing. Most of all, it slips the conflict into a bigger picture of great power disputes, making it easier to obfuscate what you are really doing on the local level.

Last but not least, both Hitler and Putin have been adamant in their conviction of their own side as the victim of a bigger conspiracy. In his letter, Hitler expressed the opinion that Poland would never have tried to resist Germany had it not been for the irresponsible security guarantees that had been given by Britain and France. Likewise, Putin has numerous times alluded to a Western conspiracy to bring Russia down, a conspiracy in which Ukraine is but a pawn at the service of greater powers.

Honest Hitler - Perfidious Putin

While the similarities between 1939 and 2022 are numerous there are also differences. An obvious one is Hitler's forthright attitude. He never denied the possibility of a German military solution to the political situation. On the contrary, this was the expected outcome should political solutions not be forthcoming. This is in stark contrast to the Russian leadership who denied the eventuality of a Russian military invasion right up until the invasion actually happened.

It is also difficult to imagine Hitler in the role of the Russian president of 2014, when a smirking Vladimir Putin denied all knowledge of the "little green men" who had just taken control of Crimea. Hitler's background as an army grunt might have made him more candid than the former KGB agent Putin, but it might also be that the 1930s were more permissive of frank talking from its politicians.

To be sure, Hitler was no habitual truth teller. In his letter to Daladier he solemnly declared that Germany had renounced all claims on Alsace-Lorraine. This no doubt felt like the right thing to say at that point in time. But less than a year later, after Germany had been victorious in the Battle of France, the two French provinces were immediately incorporated into the German Reich.

Lessons from history

The real difference between 1 September 1939 and 24 February 2022 might not be what happened before those dates but what happened afterwards. After predictably crushing Poland, Germany continued to invade Scandinavia, defeat France, one of the superpowers of the time, brutally pacify most of the Balkans and invade North Africa all the way to western Egypt until finally invading the Soviet Union and coming to halt somewhere in central Russia. In 1939, Germany surprised the world with how good it was at waging war. In 2022, Russia surprised the world with how bad it was.

There are also lessons to be learned for the rest of the world. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. But it was Britain and France who made it a world war by declaring war on Germany two days later. History has praised their decision to stand up to German aggression but a fairer assessment should put at least some blame on them for the 100 million who died in the six years of bloodshed that followed.

By comparison, the Western powers have played a much shrewder game in 2022. Russia has been condemned for its invasion of Ukraine, but no one has come to Ukraine's actual defense. Strong sanctions and lavish gifts of military hardware have still made Russia's invasion something of a fiasco. The West has succeeded admirably in punishing Russia for its misdeeds without escalating the situation.

We will never know what would have happened had Britain and France applied a more modern approach to Germany's invasion of Poland. Most probably Poland would have succumbed to the German arms as quickly as it did in the real world. And most probably Hitler's Germany would have lashed out militarily in some direction after its Polish success.

But with formal peace it would have been much more difficult for Hitler to persuade his Germans to attack westwards towards France, even if punitive sanctions had been applied. Much less north into Scandinavia or south into the Balkans. The Soviets would also have found it more difficult to demand political and territorial concessions of Finland and the Baltic states had there not been a major war ongoing.

When the genie of war is out of its bottle many things go that would not otherwise have been possible. That might be the real lesson from the start of the Second World War. The Hitler from 27 August still tried to be civilized. With the declaration of war all pretensions of civilized behavior could be dropped. And when civilization goes away, all sorts of barbaric behavior comes to the fore.